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CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION PROGRAM
FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Included in your coursebook is my fairly comprehensive
outline of federal criminal appellate practice in the Second
circuit.

The outline is divided into four parts:

appealability

at page 243; mechanics of appeal at page 248; scope of review at
page 255; appellate advocacy at page 258; and decisionmaking at
page 263.

Also included is a list of suggested references at

page 266.

You will find the section on appealability quite

complete, since I have tried to pull together all our leading
cases on this important and sometimes confusing subject.

There

is one omission in that section, however, that I shall correct a
little later.

Rather than discuss each of the subjects covered

in the outline, I intend to use part of the time allotted to me
to answer three questions frequently asked by members of the Bar.
The first question is:

"Why are such a large proportion of

criminal appeals unsuccessful in the Second Circuit?"
question, related to the first, is:

"What kind of attention do

criminal cases really get in the court of Appeals?"
is:

"When is mandamus appropriate?"

The second

The third

I shall use the remainder

of the time allotted to me to answer any other questions you may
have.
First, some interesting statistics:

During the 12 month

period ending June 30, 1987, 525 criminal appeals were terminated
in our court.

Of these cases, 121 were terminated by

36

consolidation; 132 on procedural grounds and 272 on the merits.
There were reversals in only 22 of the 272 criminal appeals
decided on the merits.

The reversal rate, therefore, was 8.1%!

What accounts for such a low rate of reversal?

The answer has

come to me gradually during my service as a member of the court,
and I share it with you in the hope that it will inform the
presentation of your appeals in the Second Circuit:

the

constraints of appellate review account for the low rate of
reversal in criminal cases.
Let's take a look at some of these constraints.

Although

defense counsel persist in challenging the sufficiency of
evidence supporting conviction, the appellate court is subject to
some very significant constraints in this area.

Although we may

have some questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying a conviction, we must sustain the verdict if we find
that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is a further constraint affecting sufficiency of the
evidence review:

the circuit court must, after viewing all

pieces of evidence in conjunction and not in isolation, draw all
favorable inferences and resolve all issues of credibility in
favor of the prosecution.

Nevertheless, defense counsel persist

in arguing on appeal that this witness or that witness is not
credible because of inconsistencies in testimony or for other
reasons.
nil.

Chances of prevailing on such arguments are practically

A procedural tip -- in order to preserve a claim of

insufficiency of evidence for appeal, a motion for judgment of
acquittal should be made at the close of all the evidence.
There are some other constraints with regard to factual
findings.

For example, a district court's finding of consent to

search will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.

As to the

factual question of custody, the Supreme Court has said that a
court of appeals errs in substituting its finding for that of the
trial court on that issue.

My colleague, Judge Newman, disagrees

with me as to the constraints on appellate review of the custody
question, as appears from my dissent in the Ceballos decision
cited in the outline.

Although the general rule is that a

district court's ruling may not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous, the Supreme Court has held that the Court of Appeals
must make an independent determination on the issue of
voluntariness when the privilege against self-incrimination is
claimed.
A district judge's determination to admit or exclude an
expert's testimony is upheld unless "manifestly erroneous."
Despite this constraint and the liberal rules of evidence
regarding expert testimony, defense counsel continue to urge
reversal on the grounds of erroneous admission of expert opinion.
Although we have expressed concern about the propriety of some
expert testimony and will undoubtedly have something further to
say on the subject, defense counsel have an uphill battle in
attacking the testimony of an expert.

We have said that we will

not overrule a district court's decision to curtail cross-

examination unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

We

have a number of cases where cross-examination is curtailed by
the trial judge.

In some of those cases we may think that we

would have exercised our discretion against curtailment.

We are

constrained, however, to rule against the appellant on this
issue in the absence of a difficult-to-make showing of abuse of
discretion.

The abuse of discretion constraint also applies in

the review of district court decisions relating to severance,
consolidation, continuance, change of venue and motions to
withdraw guilty pleas.
One of the most important constraints on appellate review,
and one certainly worthy of serious consideration by the
appellate bar in each criminal appeal, is the harmless error rule.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure tells us
that errors which do not affect substantial rights are to be
disregarded.

This rule gives us the right to look at the record

as a whole and to declare that, although there was error at
trial, the error did not affect the outcome.

It is a rule that

gives us some difficulty, because it involves placing ourselves
in the position of jurors and saying that we would have convicted
even if some item of defense evidence were available to us or
even if some item of prosecution evidence were not available to
us.
In writing a brief or in arguing an appeal where error is
apparent, counsel for the appellant must recognize the harmless
error constraint and persuade us that the error was of such

magnitude that it infected the fairness of the trial -- that a
reasonable juror would not have voted to convict but for the
error, that the error was prejudicial and inseparable in the
minds of the jury.

constitutional error can be regarded as

harmless only if it can be said to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court has held that some

constitutional errors, such as double jeopardy, invoke rights so
important as to require automatic reversal.
We are severely constrained in our review of errors in trial
procedure.

As to evidentiary matters, we are instructed by Rule

103(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that the admission or
exclusion of evidence is not error unless a party's substantial
rights are affected, and a specific objection is made in cases of
admission or an offer of proof is made in cases of exclusion.
With respect to the assignment of error for giving or failing to
give an instruction to a jury, an important constraint is the
rule that such error may not be assigned unless specific
objection is made before the jury retires.
Earlier on, when I was discussing statistics relating to
criminal appeals in the Second Circuit, I observed that 132 of
the 525 terminated cases were concluded on procedural grounds.
Thus, 25% of all terminations were for procedural reasons.

A

great number of cases in this category were terminated for lack
of appealability.

Clearly, the final judgment rule, as modified

by the collateral order doctrine, is a major constraint on
appellate review.

I urge you to consider the question of

appealability before filing a notice of appeal in a federal
criminal case.

Just to round out my outline on the subject of

appealability, I refer you to a case in our circuit in which a
defendant was held entitled to immediate appellate review of the
denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment.

The motion was

grounded in the doctrine of separation of powers and was made by
a Congressman who was charged with conspiracy and bribery in the
Abscam case.

Like the speech and debate clause, the doctrine of

separation of powers is considered so important to effective
representation of the people that any question regarding its
applicability should be determined immediately.

United States v.

Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980).
Finally, although it almost seems unnecessary to say so,
appellate review is constrained by precedent.

I say "almost

unnecessary" because, from time to time, we see appellate
advocates who are blissfully unaware of, who ignore, or who seek
to overturn precedent.

Very recently I sat on a panel hearing an

appeal from a conviction for failure to file currency transaction
reports.

Despite very recent precedent to the contrary, the

attorney for appellant insisted that the reporting obligation
fell only on financial institutions and not on the individual
employees who structure the transactions.

It just doesn't make

sense to ask the circuit to contravene a precedent established
within the past few months.

A rule of decision announced by one

panel of the circuit is binding on the entire court.

Generally,

the only way to change the precedent is through an in bane

determination.

Occasionally, a panel will depart from precedent

after circulating a decision to the entire court to ascertain
whether there is any objection.

In such cases, the fact of

circulation will be noted in the decision.

I note here that in

bane rehearing is reserved for those very rare cases where full
court consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of
decisions or when the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.

A word to the wise -- a visit to Lexis

or Westlaw just before the brief is filed and again just before
oral argument is recommended.
Having given you some idea of the narrow compass in which
circuit judges work, I pass to the second frequently-asked
question:

"What kind of attention do criminal cases really get

in the Second Circuit?"

Considering the skepticism of the

appellate attorneys who ask that question, my short answer is:
"A lot more than you think."
Some two to three weeks before each court sitting, the
judges receive the briefs and appendices in each case to be heard
at the sitting.

It is my practice to read the briefs and to skim

through what I consider the important parts of the appendices.

I

insert here one of my most severe gripes about appellate advocacy
-- it frequently happens that something I am looking for is
omitted from the appendix, in which much unnecessary material is
included.

Following my reading, I examine the bench memos

prepared by my clerks and review the memos with them.

We may do

further research to answer any questions that may occur to us.

We try to identify the important issues that we hope will be
covered by oral argument.

Most of my colleagues use the same or

similar procedures in preparing for the sitting.
So it should be apparent that a great deal of consideration
has been given to each case by each judge by the time we arrive
for a sitting.

I daresay that each of us by then has formed at

least a tentative opinion in each case, subject to persuasion by
oral argument or by discussion with our colleagues.

We seldom

review a case among ourselves prior to oral argument, but
sometimes we get a view of each other's impressions of the case
during the argument.

Those of you who have argued criminal

appeals in our court know that we are very attentive during the
oral argument.

In spite of what many may think, oral

presentation continues to be a vital part of our decisionmaking
process.

From time to time, a judge will remark, following oral

argument, that his perception of the case was turned around
completely by the verbal exchange.

That being true, it is a

source of concern to many of us that there are so many
deficiencies in appellate advocacy in general and in oral
argument in particular.

At any rate, it seems to me that it is

very foolish for an attorney to pass up the opportunity for oral
argument.
Further consideration is given to many of our cases in the
robing room following oral argument, and final decisionmaking
occurs there in some cases.

In other cases, tentative votes are

recorded and voting memos will be exchanged in the remainder.

Voting memos are a long standing tradition in the Second Circuit
and customarily are exchanged on the day of oral argument or on
the following day.

These memos provide a written record of a

judge's vote as well as a brief summary of rationale.

They are

of great value to the judge ultimately assigned to write the
opinion.
At the end of a week's sitting, the judges generally meet
and review all the cases heard during the week, discuss the
voting memoranda and share any additional thoughts they may have
had since the memoranda were exchanged.

The votes are then taken

and recorded, and opinions are assigned by the senior active
judge, unless that judge is in dissent.
active judge next senior assigns.

In the latter case, the

By the time of the conference,

decisions on those appeals found to have no precedential value
("jurisprudential purpose") will have been disposed of by summary
order.
Further consideration is given to each criminal case when
proposed opinions are circulated.

Very often, the non-writing

judges will suggest changes in the opinion.

Sometimes, the

writing judge will advise that his or her view of the case has
changed, and there will then be additional conferences or the
exchange of additional memoranda, and a realignment of original
voting positions may ensue.

Attention is given to criminal cases

even after the summary orders or opinions are filed.
about when we consider petitions for rehearing.

This comes

Finally, each

member of the court will give attention to the case when

suggestions for rehearing in bane are circulated.

Any judge may

call for a vote on rehearing in bane, and a majority vote of the
active judges is necessary to convene the court for such a
rehearing.

Although in bane sittings are rare, they seem to be

on the increase.

By now, I think, you should be satisfied that a

great deal of attention is devoted to the consideration of
criminal cases by the judges of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Now to mandamus, a little known device for getting the
circuit court to pass on an issue without going through the
regular appeals process.

Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure provide,s that an application for a writ of
mandamus is made by filing a petition with the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals with proof of service on the respondent judge and on
all parties to the trial court proceeding.

The rule sets forth

the contents of the petition and tells us that an answer should
not be filed unless directed by the court.

Supplementary Rule 21

of the Rules of the Second Circuit instructs that the petition
should not bear the name of the district judge but should be
titled only:

In re

, the name of the petitioner.

Generally, a three part test must be met if mandamus is to
be granted.

There must be (1) a usurpation of power by the

district court; (2) a clear abuse of discretion and (3) the
presence of an issue of first impression.

We have held that the

purpose of mandamus is to confine an inferior court to the lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to

exercise its authority when there is a duty to do so.
discretionary and sparingly exercised.

It is

In criminal cases

mandamus is used to curtail lower court disruption of the
administration of criminal justice.
In a case decided in 1987, In re United States, 834 F.2d
283, mandamus was granted on a petition of the government in an
ongoing RICO prosecution.

There, the district court had ordered

the government to disclose all oral statements made by the
defendants and co-conspirators that the government intended to
offer at trial as admissions of a defendant, so long as at some
point the statements had been "memorialized" in one form or
another.

The district court invoked what it claimed to be its

"inherent power" to require appropriate discovery as authority
for the order to disclose.

However, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure provides only that the substance of oral
statements made to government agents shall be disclosed and
Jencks Act discovery only extends to disclosure for impeachment
purposes.

Since the district court had made the same error in a

previous case and continued to insist on its non-existent
"inherent power," mandamus clearly was indicated.
recent case,

u.s. v.

In a very

Coonan, decided February 11, 1988, the

government lost a petition for mandamus.

In that case, the

government, in another RICO situation, sought to prevent the
district judge from having the jury render a special verdict on
predicate acts rather than a general verdict encompassing
enterprise, pattern of racketeering activity and all the elements

necessary to establish the offense.
Having attempted to answer the three most frequently asked
questions, I am open to any further questions you may have.

